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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary reason creditors take a mortgage or security
interest in a debtor's property is to enable the creditor to use the
collateral to satisfy the debtor's obligation in the event of default.
The creditor's interest becomes particularly significant in the
event of the debtor's bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, the secured
creditor's interest in the collateral will either be protected, or the
creditor will be entitled to enforce its lien against the collateral.
Recently, however, bankruptcy courts have been forced to
address the issue of the extent to which a secured creditor's lien
survives a bankruptcy proceeding. Chapter 7 debtors have argued
that § 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code entitles a debtor to "strip
down" the liens of undersecured creditors to the value of the
property subject to the creditors' interest at the time of the bank-
ruptcy. To the extent that a creditor's claim exceeds the value of
the property, debtors argue the lien is avoided.
On January 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court
resolved this issue, at least in the context of a Chapter 7 proceed-
ing, in Dewsnup v. Timm.' The Chapter 7 debtors in Dewsnup
commenced an adversary proceeding against a secured creditor,
seeking to avoid the unsecured portion of a mortgage lien on non-
residential real property pursuant to § 506(d).2 The debtors pro-
posed paying the secured creditor the full amount of the secured
portion of the claim in satisfaction of the mortgage lien. Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a majority of six justices, held that
§ 506(d) does not allow a Chapter 7 debtor to "strip down" a
secured creditor's lien by paying the fair market value of the prop-
erty subject to the lien in order to obtain release of the lien.3
Interpreted narrowly, Dewsnup appears innocuous and, on
the whole, produced an arguably equitable result. The Supreme
Court's statutory analysis and result-oriented reasoning, however,
1. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
2. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 774 (1992).
3. Id. at 778. Justice Thomas took no part in the decision, and Justice Souter joined in
the dissent.
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have opened a Pandora's Box of definitional issues that will plague
bankruptcy judges and practitioners for years to come. In addi-
tion, although the Court sought to restrict its holding to lien avoid-
ance in Chapter 7 liquidation cases, there can be little doubt that
Dewsnup's unique definition of "secured claim" will be injected
into cases under Chapters 11, 12, and 13. In the words of Justice
Scalia, in his dissent, "[the Court] having taken this case to resolve
uncertainty regarding one provision, we end by spawning confu-
sion regarding scores of others."4
II. HISTORY OF LIEN STRIPPING UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
A. IN GENERAL
Lien stripping is the use of § 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to
reduce or "strip down" the liens of undersecured creditors to the
value of the property subject to the creditor's interest at the time
of bankruptcy. To the extent that the creditor's claim exceeds the
value of the property, the lien is said to be avoided. Although this
process is statutorily authorized in Chapters 11, 12, and 13, Chap-
ter 7 does not specifically allow or prohibit lien stripping. Chapter
7, however, does restrict the extent to which debtors are entitled
to "redeem" property that is subject to the creditor's lien.
1. Pre-Code Practice
Prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 allowed debtors to lien strip in bankruptcies under
either the business reorganization, Chapter X, or the real property
arrangement, Chapter XII. Debtors in straight or liquidation
Chapter VII bankruptcies, however, could not lien strip, nor did
such debtors possess the right of redemption of property now
authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 722.
Real estate lenders, particularly nonrecourse mortgagees,
were negatively affected under the Bankruptcy Act. In re Pine
Gate Associates5 demonstrates the hardships experienced by such
creditors. In Pine Gate, the debtor was a limited partnership that
owned an apartment building subject to a nonrecourse mortgage.
The mortgaged real property was worth substantially less than the
amount of the debt that the debtor owed to the secured creditors.6
4. Id. at 788 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1958).
6. In re Pine Gate Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478, 1479 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1958).
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The debtor's proposed arrangement contemplated paying the
secured creditors the appraised value of the property at the time
of confirmation. The secured creditors objected.7
The court held that the plan could be confirmed despite
objections from creditors.' The court reasoned that if the secured
creditors received cash equal to the value of the property at the
time of the confirmation, they would be in the same position they
would have been in had there been a liquidation sale of the prop-
erty, and would receive the full value of their secured claims.9
The court also determined that the nonrecourse secured creditors
were not entitled to vote on the debtor's plan as unsecured credi-
tors because their claims were limited to the value of their secur-
ity.10 As a result, the debtor was able to retain the property free of
the creditors' liens upon payment of the appraised value of the
property at the time of the confirmation. Moreover, to the extent
that the property appreciated after confirmation, the secured
creditors did not share in the gain.
2. Lien Stripping in a Chapter 11 Case
Sections 506(a) and 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code effectively
"bifurcate" classes of claims allowed under § 502 into their
secured and unsecured components." Section 506(a) provides
that:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is
an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor's interest. . . is less than the amount of such
allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposi-
tion or use of such property, and in conjunction with any
hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting
such creditor's interest.12
Section 1129(bX2) provides that the bankruptcy court may
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1478.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1030 (1989).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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confirm a plan of reorganization over the objection of a secured
creditor if, among other requirements,
(bX2) [w]ith respect to a class of secured claims, the plan
provides:
(iXI) that the holders of such claims retain the liens
securing such claims, whether the property subject to
such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to
another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount
of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive
on account of such claim deferred cash payments
totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of
a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least
the value of such holder's interest in the estate's
interest in such property ....
In order to protect secured creditors against situations similar
to the one presented in Pine Gate, Congress enacted § 1111 (b) as
part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Section 1111(b) pro-
vides as follows:
(bX1XA) A claim secured by a lien on property of the
estate shall be allowed or disallowed under section 502
of this title the same as if the holder of such claim had
recourse against the debtor on account of such claim,
whether or not such holder has recourse, unless-
(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects, by
at least two thirds in amount and more than half
in number of allowed claims of such class, appli-
cation of paragraph (2) of this subsection; or
(ii) such holder does not have such recourse and
such property is sold under section 363 of this
title or is to be sold under the plan.
(B) A class of claims may not elect application of par-
agraph (2) of this subsection if-
(i) the interest on account -of such claims of the
holders of such claims in such property is of
inconsequential value; or
(ii) the holder of a claim of such class has
recourse against the debtor on account of
such claim and such property is sold under
13. Id. § 1129(bX2)(1988).
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section 363 of this title or is to be sold under
the plan.
(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding
section 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim
to the extent that such claim is allowed. 14
Section 1111 (bX1), therefore, treats a nonrecourse secured credi-
tor as if it had recourse against the debtor and as if it had an
unsecured claim, which thereby allows the creditor to participate
in the reorganization process as an unsecured creditor. Section
111 1(bX2), on the other hand, allows an undersecured creditor to
consider its claim, to the extent that it is allowed, fully secured and
waive its unsecured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Under
§ 1111(bX2), therefore, a secured creditor may insist on payment
to the full extent of its lien, usually requiring the debtor to either
surrender the property in satisfaction of the lien, or pay the lien in
full. It is important to remember, however, that even with the
election, if the debtor makes payment to the secured creditor over
time (i.e., the secured creditor retains its lien), the economic effect
is the same. This is because the debtor is required to pay only a
stream of payments having a present value equal to the value of
the property.
3. Lien Stripping Under Chapter 12 and Chapter 13
Sections 1225 and 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code also expressly
allow lien stripping in the context of family farm reorganizations
(Chapter 12) and the adjustment of debts of an individual with reg-
ular income (Chapter 13). These sections provide, in relevant
part, as follows:
§ 1225 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall
confirm a plan if
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim pro-
vided for by the plan
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the
plan;
(BXi) the plan provides that the holder of such
claim retain the lien securing such claim;
and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of property to be distributed by the
14. Id. § 111l(b) (1988).
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trustee or the debtor under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing
such claim to the holder .... 15
§ 1325 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall
confirm a plan if
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim pro-
vided for by the plan
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the
plan;
(BXi) the plan provides that the holder of such
claim retain the lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of property to be distributed under the plan
on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing
such claim to the holder ... 1
Under either Chapter 12 or Chapter 13, the debtor may bifurcate
a secured creditor's claim under § 506(a). The debtor's plan may
then treat the creditor as secured to the extent of the value of the
property securing the creditor's interest and unsecured to the
extent the creditor's claim exceeds the value of the property.
B. AVAILABILITY OF LIEN STRIPPING IN CHAPTER 7 CASES
1. The Rationale
As discussed above, lien stripping is the use of § 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code to "strip down" the liens of undersecured credi-
tors to the value of the property subject to the creditor's interest at
the time of the bankruptcy. To the extent that the creditor's claim
exceeds the value of the property, the lien is said to be avoided. 17
Section 506(a) provides the debtor with the power to bifurcate
a claim secured by a lien to its secured and unsecured compo-
nents. The secured portion is defined by § 506 as "an allowed
secured claim." It could readily be argued that § 506(d) provides
15. Id. § 1225 (1988).
16. Id. § 1325 (1988).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
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Chapter 7 debtors with the power to avoid the undersecured por-
tion of the claim. Section 506(d) provides that:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is
void, unless
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section
502(bX5) or 502(c) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due
only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such
claim under section 501 of this title.' 8
This rationale formed the basis for the application of lien stripping
principles in Chapter 7 cases. Under this analysis, a Chapter 7
debtor was entitled to file a petition in bankruptcy, schedule the
property possessing negative equity at the time of filing, and avoid
the secured creditor's lien to the extent the amount of the claim
secured by the lien exceeded the value of the property. As a
result, the debtor was essentially entitled to "redeem" the collat-
eral from the lien at the value it possessed as of the date of the
petition.
This theory of avoidance and redemption worked to expand a
Chapter 7 debtor's power to redeem property, previously limited
under § 722, to all property in which the debtor's estate had an
interest. Several circuit courts have considered this application of
§ 506(d). 19 Their analyses will be discussed below.
In re Lindsey21
In Lindsey, the trustee abandoned the debtors' entire bank-
ruptcy estate because he determined that it had no value to
unsecured creditors. 2' The bankruptcy court interpreted § 506(d)
to allow the debtors to avoid liens on a portion of their real prop-
erty and gave the debtors thirty days to redeem the property at its
current market value. 2
Instead of redeeming their real property by paying the credi-
tor its value, the debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling.
The mortgage debt had been in default since before the bank-
ruptcy filing and was now payable in full. The debtors asked the
18. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (emphasis added).
19. See Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989); In re
Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987).
20. 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987).
21. In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1987).
22. Id.
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district court to essentially rewrite the existing mortgage and
allow them to resume making installment payments to the secured
creditor at the reduced amount.
The district court denied this relief and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. Neither the district court nor the court
of appeals, however, disturbed the bankruptcy court's avoidance
of the secured creditor's lien under § 506(d).23
Folendore v. United States Small Business Administration (In re
Folendore)24
In Folendore, the debtors sought to avoid a junior lien held by
the Small Business Administration (SBA).2" The SBA's lien was
junior to two mortgages that secured debts exceeding the prop-
erty value.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allow the
SBA to retain its lien in the hope of obtaining a lien on any future
equity that the debtor could generate in the property.26 The court
reasoned that following the bankruptcy filing, the SBA's lien was
subject to elimination by the foreclosure of the senior mortgagees'
interest. This result left "a creditor like the SBA with nothing,
which is exactly what section 506(d) on its face says it has."'28 As a
result, the debtors were entitled to avoid the junior lien and
redeem the property free of the SBA's interest.
Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association 29
As in Folendore, the debtors in Gaglia owed the SBA a sub-
stantial obligation secured by a junior mortgage on the debtors'
homestead property. 30 After payment of the senior mortgage,
only approximately $5,000 of the SBA's claim was considered to be
secured by the mortgage. The SBA's claim exceeded the value of
the real property by approximately $195,000. The debtors sought
to avoid the unsecured portion of the SBA's claim and redeem the
homestead from the mortgage lien by paying the SBA $5,000."'
23. Id.
24. 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
25. Folendore v. United States Small Business Admin. (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537,
1538 (11th Cir. 1989).
26. Id. at 1539.
27. Id. at 1540.
28. Id.
29. 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989).
30. Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1305 (3d Cir. 1989)
(abrogated by Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1992)).
31. Id.
1993]
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The bankruptcy court denied relief. The court in Maitland v.
Central Fidelity Bank (In re Maitland),32 concluded that § 506 was
intended to apply only to property administered under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, not to property abandoned or released from the
estate.33 The bankruptcy court reasoned that allowing the debtors
to avoid the SBA's lien and redeem the property for the value of
the secured claim would run contrary to 11 U.S.C. § 722. 3' The
bankruptcy court concluded that because § 506(d) made no dis-
tinction between real and personal property and offered the
debtor a better remedy than § 722, allowing debtors to use
§ 506(d) to avoid undersecured liens and redeem the property free
of those liens would render § 722 superfluous.35 The district court
concurred with the bankruptcy court's analysis and affirmed the
lower court's decision.
The Third Circuit of Appeals, however, reversed the bank-
ruptcy court's holding.36 The court of appeals agreed with the
debtors' interpretation that § 506(d) "on its face" allowed debtors
to avoid undersecured liens. The court reasoned that avoidance
under § 506(d) would "place the SBA in the same position as if the
property had been liquidated. In liquidation, the SBA would have
received the difference between the sale price and the balance
remaining on the first mortgage. 37
As a policy consideration, the court of appeals reasoned that:
While the SBA is no worse off than if the property
were sold, the [debtors] may realize significant benefits
from lien avoidance. They may be better able to negoti-
ate a repayment schedule with the SBA for the reduced
amount of the secured claim. Thus, they have an
increased chance to retain their homestead.38
32. 61 B.R. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
33. Maitland v. Central Fidelity Bank (In re Maitland), 61 B.R. 130, 132-33 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1986).
34. Id. at 133-34. Section 722 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
[a]n individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to
redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended
primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a
dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempted under section 522 of
this title or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by paying the
holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of the holder that is
secured by such lien.
I I U.S.C. § 722 (1988) (emphasis added).
35. Maitland, 61 B.R. at 134-35.
36. Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1304.
37. Id. at 1308.
38. Id.
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The court of appeals also disagreed with the bankruptcy
court's interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 722. The court rejected the
argument that any "arguable redundancy" in § 506 and § 722 pre-
cluded the application of § 506 to avoid the SBA's lien.39 The
court concurred with an established line of bankruptcy court opin-
ions which rejected the position that the Code's silence as to addi-
tional means of avoidance and redemption limited a Chapter 7
debtor's powers to § 722. Quoting In re Mays, the court of appeals
reasoned that:
[I]t is a quantum leap to assume . . . that, since § 722 is
limited in scope, no other Code section could be utilized
to expand those limitations. Neither the Code on its face
nor any legislative history known to us expressed an
intention to limit the avoiding powers of a Chapter 7
debtor to the scope of § 722, and thus prevent Chapter 7
debtors from taking actions to preserve their realty or
nonconsumer personalty in the bankruptcy. The pres-
ence of § 522(f X1), which clearly is not subject to the limi-
tations of § 722, is evidence of at least one tool which
Congress gave to Chapter 7 debtors, inter alia, to deal
with liens on realty. We therefore believe that reasoning
based on the assumption that § 722 pre-empts the field of
avoidance tools available to a Chapter 7 debtor is not only
dangerously presumptive, but plainly wrong.4 °
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the bankruptcy court's
holding and allowed the debtor to avoid the undersecured portion
of the SBA's lien.41
2. The Conflict
Despite the uncertainty of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals'
interpretation of § 506(d), a number of bankruptcy courts have
refused to treat § 722 so lightly. In Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dew-
snup),42 the bankruptcy court reasoned that § 722 presented an
irreconcilable conflict prohibiting use of 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) to
avoid liens and redeem real property.43 Dewsnup ultimately pro-
39. Id. at 1310.
40. Id. (quoting In re Mays, 85 B.R. 955, 959 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)). See also In re
Gibbs, 44 B.R. 475, 478 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (opining that § 506(d) and § 722 are not
inconsistent, and any arguable redundancy does not justify limiting § 506(d) which is
unambiguous on its face).
41. Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1311.
42. 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988).
43. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676, 680 (Bankr. D. Utah).
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vided the basis for a conflict among the circuits sufficient to war-
rant review by the United States Supreme Court."
III. DEWSNUP v. TIMM
A. BANKRUPTCY COURT ANALYSIS OF DEWSNUP45
The debtors in Dewsnup argued that pursuant to § 506(d), a
lien was void to the extent it did not secure an "'allowed secured
claim.' 46 Since an "'allowed secured claim' is limited to the
value of the collateral pursuant to § 506(a)," the debtors argued
that they should be entitled to pay their secured creditor the value
of its interest in their homestead and redeem the property free
and clear of the creditor's lien.47
The bankruptcy court, however, denied the debtors the relief
requested. The court noted that the authorities were split among
those bankruptcy courts allowing Chapter 7 debtors to avoid liens
under § 506(d).48 The bankruptcy court reasoned that:
[t]his problem is a difficult one from a policy perspective
because of the apparent divergence here between the
law and one's sense of what is equitable. On the one
hand, as other courts have noted, the relevant question is
what the lienholder's interest would be outside bank-
ruptcy. That is, what each lienholder would receive in a
foreclosure should also be the worth of his lien in the
bankruptcy setting. On the other hand, it seems mani-
festly unfair to permit a debtor to retain his house after
44. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
45. Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676.
46. Id. at 677.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 678-79. Those courts which have allowed Chapter 7 debtors to avoid liens
under § 506(d) include: Pioneer Fed. Say. Bank v. Crouch (In re.Crouch), 76 B.R. 91 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1987); O'Leary v. State (In re O'Leary), 75 B.R. 881 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); Worrell
v. Federal Land Bank (In re Worrell), 67 B.R. 16 (C.D. I11. 1986); Lindsey v. Federal Land
Bank (In re Lindsey), 64 B.R. 19 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1986); Cleveringa v. United States (In re
Cleveringa), 52 B.R. 56 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); Lyons v. First Pa. Bank (In re Lyons), 46
B.R. 604 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); Gibbs v. F & M Marquette Nat'l Bank (In re Gibbs), 44 B.R.
475 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); Bracken v. Mount Vernon Consumer Discount Co. (In re
Bracken), 35 B.R. 84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); Brace v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (In re
Brace), 33 B.R. 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Tanner v. Financeamerica Consumer Discount
Co. (In re Tanner), 14 B.R. 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981); Walker v. First Fed. Say. and Loan
(In re Walker), 11 B.R. 43 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1981).
Those courts which have denied Chapter 7 debtors the power to avoid liens because of
a perceived conflict with the redemption powers provided by 11 U.S.C. § 722 include:
Smith v. Vermont Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n (In re Smith), 79 B.R. 650 (Bankr. D. Md. 1987);
Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. and Loan (In re Gaglia), 76 B.R. 82 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd,
889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989); Geico v. Geico Fin. Serv. (In re Cordes), 37 B.R. 582 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1984); Maitland v. Central Fid. Bank (In re Maitland), 61 B.R. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1986); In re Mahaner, 34 B.R. 308 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983).
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avoiding liens to the extent they exceed the value of the
collateral.4 9
The court concluded that, to allow debtors to avoid liens on
their homestead real property under § 506(d), and then redeem
the property free of liens, would render § 722 superfluous. The
district court summarily confirmed.
B. TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ANALYSIS OF
DEWSNUP
50
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's holding.51 The court of appeals reasoned that it was
a "fundamental premise" of § 506(a) that a secured claim may only
be avoided if the estate possesses an interest in the property sub-
ject to the claim .5 The court concluded that because the debtors'
estate had abandoned the property, neither § 506(a) nor, by impli-
cation, § 506(d) applied. The court reasoned that a contrary result
would be inconsistent with 11 U.S.C. § 722."
In deciding Dewsnup, the court of appeals recognized that its
decision directly conflicted with the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals' holding in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n.54 The Supreme Court accepted review to resolve this
conflict.
C. . SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF DEWSNUP55
As discussed above, numerous bankruptcy courts and several
circuit courts of appeal had previously considered the issues
presented in Dewsnup. The analysis adopted by proponents of
both sides was coherent, evidenced sound statutory interpretation,
and reflected actual practice under both the Bankruptcy Code and
the Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court could have applied the
well-reasoned rationale advanced by either of the circuit courts.
Instead, the Supreme Court decided to improvise.
The Court reasoned that the words "allowed secured claim"
in § 506(d) need "not be read as an indivisible term of art defined
by reference to § 506(a), which by its terms is not a definitional
49. Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 679 (quoting In re Lyons, 46 B.R. 604, 606-07 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1985)).
50. 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
51. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 593 (10th Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 590.
53. Id. at 590-91.
54. 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989).
55. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
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provision."'5 6 Rather, the Court held that words should be read
term-by-term to refer to any claim that is first, allowed, and sec-
ond, secured.57 Because there was no question that the claim at
issue had been "allowed" pursuant to § 502 of the Code and was
secured by a lien with recourse to the underlying collateral, the
Court reasoned that it did not come within the scope of § 506(d),
which voids only liens corresponding to claims that have not been
allowed and secured.58 Accordingly, the Court concluded that,
because the secured creditor's claim on the recourse debt was
allowed under § 502, the lien securing the claim was essentially
worth the entire amount of the claim-$120,000 more than the
collateral's value. 59
D. THE DISSENT
Justice Scalia's disagreement with the majority opinion was
apparently so profound that his response could not be constrained
to one opinion. Through his dissent in Dewsnup6° and his con-
currence in Patterson v. Shumate,6 1 Justice Scalia embarked upon
a scathing criticism of the majority's skills of statutory
interpretation.
Justice Scalia reasoned that the dispute in Dewsnup turned
solely on the meaning of a single phrase-"allowed secured
claim"-found throughout the Bankruptcy Code.6" Congress, Jus-
tice Scalia argued, did not leave the meaning of "allowed secured
claim" to speculation. "Section 506(a) says that an 'allowed claim'
(the meaning of which is obvious) is also a 'secured claim' 'to the
extent of the value of[the] creditor's interest in the estate's interest
in [the securing] property."'63 Justice Scalia concluded that
"[w]hen § 506(d) refers to an 'allowed secured claim,' it can only
be referring to that allowed 'secured claim' so carefully described
two brief subsections earlier. '64
Justice Scalia resumed his criticism of the majority opinion in
Dewsnup six months later in Patterson v. Shumate.65 In Patterson,
the majority, this time joined by Justice Scalia, rejected its term-
56. Id. at 777.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 778.
60. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 780 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 780 (emphasis in original).
64. Id.
65. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
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by-term interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and inexplicably
adopted an analysis whereby each term was to be given a usage
consistent with interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole.
Justice Scalia, citing Dewsnup, argued in his concurrence that:
This application of a normal and obvious principle of stat-
utory construction would not merit comment, except that
we explicitly rejected it, in favor of a one-subsection-at-a-
time approach, when interpreting another provision of
this very statute earlier this Term.
'[W]e express no opinion,' our decision said, 'as to
whether the words [at issue] have different meaning in
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.'
I trust that in our search for a neutral and rational
interpretive methodology we have now come to rest, so
that the symbol of our profession may remain the scales,
not the see-saw.66
Justice Scalia struck at the heart of the weakness of the major-
ity's opinion in Dewsnup: its willingness to abandon established
principles of statutory construction to reach a desired result.
Despite the vigor of Justice Scalia's dissent, however, bankruptcy
judges and practitioners are still left to sort through the ruins and
determine what will be made of this new definition of "allowed
secured claim."
IV. LIEN AVOIDANCE AFTER DEWSNUP
In his Dewsnup dissent, Justice Scalia said that although the
majority's interpretation of § 506(d) was arguably more fair from
the standpoint of natural justice, such considerations should have
been irrelevant because the field of bankruptcy law often runs
contrary to established remedies and procedures governing the
contacts between debtors and creditors, and consistency of appli-
cation is therefore mandatory.67 Additionally, Justice Scalia
argued that:
When a seemingly clear provision can be pronounced
"ambiguous" sans textual and structural analysis, and
when the assumption of uniform meaning is replaced by
"one-subsection-at-a-time" interpretation, innumerable
statutory texts become worth litigating. In the bank-
66. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2251 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
67. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. 773, 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ruptcy field alone, for example, unfortunate future liti-
gants will have to pay the price for our expressed
neutrality .... Having taken this case to resolve uncer-
tainty regarding one provision, we end by spawning con-
fusion regarding scores of others.68
Most practitioners believe that the Dewsnup Court's interpre-
tation of "allowed secured claim" will be limited in application to
cases under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. After Dewsnup,
debtors will continue to argue that Chapters 11, 12, and 13 contain
explicit provisions allowing lien stripping through confirmation of
a plan. They will argue that the plain language of these sections
authorizes impairment of secured creditors' rights. Ultimately, it
will be left to the bankruptcy courts and appellate courts to deter-
mine whether "plain meaning" and "consistent statutory interpre-
tation" have the same meaning after Dewsnup as they did before.
In recent months the Court of Appeals for the Second6" and
Tenth Circuits70 and the Bankruptcy Districts of New York,7 1
Pennsylvania,7 2 Florida,73 and Illinois74 have considered the appli-
cability of the Dewsnup rationale to prohibit bifurcation of claims
securing personal property and involuntary liens under Chapter 7.
These cases will be discussed in detail below.
V. SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATIONS OF DEWSNUP
A. IN RE STROBER7 5
In Strober, the bankruptcy court considered the issue of
whether the Bankruptcy Code permitted a Chapter 13 plan to
modify the rights of a mortgagee holding a mortgage on the
debtor's principal place of residence notwithstanding 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(bX2).76 Section 1322(bX2) provides that a Chapter 13 plan
may modify the rights of secured creditors, but only the rights of
holders of secured claims "other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal resi-
68. Id. at 788.
69. See Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176
(2d Cir. 1992).
70. See Oklahoma v. Crook (In re Crook), 966 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1992).
71. See In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
72. See Taras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Taras), 136 B.R. 941 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1992).
73. See In re Windham, 136 B.R. 878 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1992); In re Davidoff, 136 B.R. 567
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
74. See In re Cernigilia, 137 B.R. 722 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1992).
75. 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
76. In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
[Vol. 69:129
ANALYSIS OF DEWSNUP v. TIMM
dence .... "7
Despite this seemingly explicit instruction, a number of
courts, including three circuit courts of appeals, permitted lien
stripping on homesteads under § 506(d) in Chapter 13 cases.7"
These courts reasoned that under § 506(a), a secured creditor's
claim was bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions. As a
result, only the portion that represented the value of the secured
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property was pro-
tected from modification under § 1322(bX2).79
Despite the Supreme Court's assurances that its holding in
Dewsnup was limited to lien avoidance under § 506(d) in Chapter
7 cases, the Strober court reasoned that "[t]he authority of the
decisions which have read § 506 as limiting the protection given
home mortgages by § 1322(bX2) against cramdown has been weak-
ened, if not demolished, by Dewsnup .... .8'0 In fact, the bank-
ruptcy court reasoned that those decisions allowing modification of
a secured creditor's interest in the debtor's principal residence
where the secured creditor's claim was also secured by nonresi-
dential property were weakened by the result in Dewsnup.81
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied the debtor the right to
strip down the lien of its homestead mortgagee.
B. IN RE BELLAMY 82
In Bellamy, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered
an issue identical to the one decided in Strober, approximately one
month after Strober was decided. 3 The circuit court, however,
reached the opposite conclusion and, therefore, effectively over-
ruled Strober.14
Citing Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart),5 Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,8 6 and Hougland v. Lomas & Net-
tleton Co. (In re Hougland),8 7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2) (1988).
78. See Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991);
Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas &
Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
79. But see, e.g., In re Hussman, 133 B.R. 490 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
80. Strober, 136 B.R. at 618.
81. Id. at 619.
82. 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1992). See In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
84. Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176.
85. 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991).
86. 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
87. 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
1993] 145
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
reasoned that under § 506(a), a secured creditor's claim is bifur-
cated into secured and unsecured portions."" As a result, only the
portion that represents the value of the secured creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property is protected from modifica-
tion under § 1322(bX2).8 9
Rejecting the Dewsnup rationale, the court reasoned that the
term "secured claim" as it is used in § 1322(bX2) has the same
meaning as the term "secured claim" as it is used in § 506(a).9 ° As
a result, Dewsnup's prohibition against bifurcation of secured
claims did not apply to § 1322(bX2).91 The debtors were therefore
allowed to bifurcate the claim secured by a lien of their principal
residence and treat the secured portion of that claim in their
Chapter 13 plan.92
C. IN RE TARAS 93
The central issue in Taras was whether the bankruptcy court
was required to apply the Dewsnup rationale to an action that was
nearly litigated in its entirety, except for hearings on valuation,
before Dewsnup.94 Taras, however, also involved a claim secured
by an interest in both the debtor's principal residence, and other
property of the debtor.95
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Common-
wealth Mortgage Corp.9 6 had previously held that where a credi-
tor's claim was secured by both the homestead and other, non-
homestead property, § 1322(bX2) did not prohibit modification of
the creditor's interest as part of a confirmed plan.97 The bank-
ruptcy court questioned whether it was required to follow the
established rule of law in that circuit, or whether Dewsnup
required it to deny debtor the ability to lien strip.
The bankruptcy court reasoned that:
[I]n Dewsnup, the court carefully confined its holding to
Chapter 7 cases or to other contexts in which liens were
88. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 179.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 182.
91. Id. at 183.
92. Id. at 186. See also In re Cardinale, 142 B.R. 42 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992); In re Govan,
139 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1992); In re Sainz-Dean, 139 B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992)(permitting Chapter 13 debtor to bifurcate and modify residential mortgage lien).
93. 136 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
94. Taras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. (In re Taras), 36 B.R. 941, 943 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1992).
95. Id. at 945.
96. 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
97. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1990).
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affected outside the bankruptcy process. Wilson, by way
of contrast, involved only the use of § 506 in the context
of a reorganization plan, as it is being used by the instant
Debtors. We therefore conclude that the demise of Wil-
son is far from clear, and its death certainly ought to be
pronounced, if at all, by the Third Circuit and not by this
court.9 8
The court reasoned that because Dewsnup was expressly limited
to Chapter 7 cases, in a Chapter 13 case, the court was bound by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' prior holding in Wilson.99
Additionally, in Sapos v. Provident Institution of Savings, °0 0 the
Third Circuit upheld its prior decision in Wilson and summarily
held that Dewsnup's "interpretation of section 506 in a Chapter 7
liquidation does not apply in this Chapter 13 reorganization.' 10 '
D. IN RE DAVIDOFF 10 2
In Davidoff, the bankruptcy court flatly rejected the § 506(a)
analysis in Hart, Wilson, and Hougland.0 3 The Davidoff court
paid little heed to the words of the Supreme Court limiting Dew-
snup to Chapter 7 cases and instead reasoned that:
[A]lthough Section 506 is applicable in Chapter 13 cases,
it is limited by the specific language of Section 1322(bX2).
The rights of a holder of a secured claim in the principal
residence of a debtor cannot be modified under Section
1322 notwithstanding the language of Section 506. This
position is bolstered by the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Dewsnup .... 104
The court concluded that the mortgagee possessed an allowed
claim that was secured by a lien on the debtors' homestead.
Because the lien secured their principal residence, the lien could
not be valued under § 506(a) or modified under § 1322(bX2).
E. IN RE CERNIGILIA 10 5
In Cernigilia, the bankruptcy court extended the Dewsnup
98. Taras, 136 B.R. at 950 (citations omitted).
99. Id.
100. 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992).
101. Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Sav., 967 F.2d 918, 925 (3d Cir. 1992).
102. 136 B.R. 567 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1992).
103. In re Davidoff, 136 B.R. 567, 568-69 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
104. Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
105. 137 B.R. 722 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1992).
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rationale in a Chapter 7 case to a different kind of lien. 116 The
debtors in Dewsnup attempted to avoid a consensual mortgage on
their homestead property. In Cernigilia, the debtors attempted to
avoid a judicial lien on their homestead. 10 7
The court considered the rationale of those bankruptcy courts
that had previously read §§ 506(d) and 522(fX1) together to allow
debtors to avoid the "unsecured" portions of judicial liens exceed-
ing the debtor's equity in the homestead.'0 These courts then
applied § 522(f X1) to protect the "secured" or equity portion of
the homestead by avoiding the lien impairing the debtor's
exemption.10 9
The bankruptcy court, however, declined to follow these deci-
sions. The court reasoned that "[t]he 'lien stripping' rationale of
the Galvan line of cases is no longer valid following the Supreme
Court's recent decision rejecting the 'strip down' of liens under
§ 506(d)."110 Applying the Dewsnup principles to the case before
it, the court concluded that "it is clear that a judicial lien may not
be avoided under § 522(f X 1) merely because the lien is unsecured
and remains as a charge against the property.""'
Although the debtors in Cernigilia were ultimately able to
obtain the relief requested by showing that the creditor had failed
to perfect its lien properly under Illinois state law, the bankruptcy
court's analysis should be troubling to debtors." 2 The Supreme
Court's desire to effect an equitable result for a creditor might yet
result in debtors losing their homestead following the foreclosure
of a judicial lien possessing no value.
F. IN RE WINDHAM
13
In an opinion issued by the same bankruptcy judge who
decided Davidoff, the bankruptcy court in Windham predictably
applied Dewsnup to prohibit the stripping of a lien on personal
property of.a Chapter 7 debtor. Without extensive analysis, the
court reasoned that "[a]lthough Dewsnup involved real property,
presumably it would also apply to use of Section 506 with regard to
106. In re Cernigilia, 137 B.R. 722, 723 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 724.
109. Id. See, e.g., Harris v. Herman (In re Herman), 120 B.R. 127 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1990); Galvan v. Galvan (In re Galvan), 110 B.R. 446 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); Dewyer v.
Union Bank (In re Dewyer), 11 B.R. 551 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
110. Cernigilia, 137 B.R. at 724 (citation omitted).
.111. Id. at 725.
112. See id. at 726-27.
113. 136 B.R. 878 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
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personal property." ' 4
The court concluded that because the creditor possessed an
allowed claim, and because that claim was secured by a lien on the
debtor's personal property, the Supreme Court's analysis in Dew-
snup prohibited avoidance of the unsecured portion of the credi-
tor's claim. As a result, the debtor was not allowed to avoid the
under-secured portion of the lien against her automobile in the
Chapter 7 case.
G. IN RE CROOK'
15
In Crook, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented
with the question of whether a Chapter 12 debtor could "write
down" mortgages held by the State of Oklahoma under 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)."I' The State of Oklahoma argued that the reduction of its
mortgage violated the state's sovereign immunity.11 7
The Tenth Circuit deftly avoided the Dewsnup issue. In a
footnote, the court stated that: "[n]ot present here is a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thus, we are not faced with any
problem associated with the teachings of Dewsnup v. Timm
"118
The court concluded that § 506(a) allowed Chapter 12 debtors
to "write down" a secured creditor's claim to the extent of the
market value while treating the remaining portion of the claim as
unsecured." 9 The court also concluded that § 506(a) applied
against the states under 11 U.S.C. § 106(c).'2 0
H. IN RE NOBLEMAN' 2
1
On August 13, 1992, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted the Dewsnup rationale as applied to bifurcation and mod-
ification of undersecured residential real estate mortgages.' 2 2 In
Nobleman, the Fifth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 plan may not
bifurcate an undersecured mortgage claim, secured by a mortgage
on the debtor's principal residence, into secured and unsecured
114. In re Windham, 136 B.R. 878, 883 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
115. 966 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1992).
116. Oklahoma v. Crook (In re Crook), 966 F.2d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 544.
118. Id. at 539 n.1.
119. Id. at 540-44.
120. Id.
121. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992).
122. Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir.
1992).
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components. 123 The court of appeals reasoned that the specific
language of § 1322(bX2) prevailed over the general language of
§ 506(a).124 The court concluded that the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Dewsnup only "lends support to this view that bifurca-
tion is impermissible.' 125
VI. EFFECT OF DEWSNUP ON OTHER SECTIONS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 363(fX3)
Even if bankruptcy courts respect the limited applicability of
the holding in Dewsnup, the decision will continue to have a dras-
tic effect on the administration of Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.
For example, consider the Chapter 7 bankruptcy of a partner-
ship that owns a real estate development consisting of three pieces
of adjacent real property which contains an office building, a park-
ing facility, and a retail shop/apartment complex. Consider fur-
ther that each of the facilities in the development is dependent
upon the other for its economic survival, and that prior to the
bankruptcy filing, the debtor owned the office building and the
parking lot free and clear of liens. Finally, assume that the value
of the office building and parking facility was $3,000,000, and that
the retail/apartment complex possesses a value on the date of fil-
ing of $1,000,000, but is encumbered by a mortgage in the amount
of $5,000,000.
The Chapter 7 trustee has found an individual who is willing
to buy the entire development for its fair market value as of the
date of filing, $4,000,000. Prior to Dewsnup, the trustee would
have argued that § 506 allowed the bankruptcy court to deter-
mine the value of the mortgagee's interest as of the date of filing.
In this example, the retail/apartment complex mortgagee would
have been entitled to a secured claim of $1,000,000, and an
unsecured claim of $4,000,000. The trustee would then argue that
§ 363(f)(3) allowed it to sell the development free and clear of
liens upon paying the mortgagee the value of its lien, $1,000,000.
The estate, therefore, would receive the remaining $3,000,000
and the secured creditor would likely receive a substantial distri-
123. Id. at 489.
124. Id. at 488-89.
125. Id. at 487. See also In re Lee, 137 B.R. 285 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991) and In re
Ireland, 137 B.R. 65 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (refusing to permit bifurcation and
modification of undersecured mortgage on Chapter 13 debtor's principal place of
residence).
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bution from the liquidation of the property not subject to its lien
by virtue of its unsecured claim.
After Dewsnup, the trustee is in a substantial predicament.
The estate possesses unencumbered property of a sizable value,
the trustee has found a willing buyer, but Dewsnup provides that
the mortgagee is entitled to a lien against the retail/apartment
complex in the amount of its allowed claim, $5,000,000.12'
Because Dewsnup entitles the mortgagee to a lien in the amount
of its allowed claim, if the mortgagee objects to the sale, the
trustee will not be allowed to sell the property free and clear of
liens without paying the mortgagee the full amount of its lien,
$5,000,000.
The mortgagee is thereby able to hold the estate and general
creditors hostage. Because the entire development functions as an
economic unit, the trustee will not be able to locate a buyer for the
office building and the parking facility alone. The trustee will
either be unable to sell the development or will be forced to bar-
gain with the mortgagee from a position of weakness. As a result,
the secured creditor will be able to recover from the trustee an
economic benefit much greater than the value its collateral adds to
the development.
B. AVOIDANCE OF JUDICIAL LIENS ON EXEMPT PROPERTY
AND ADJACENT PROPERTY
Under most states' laws, a judgment lien is a lien against real
property owned by the judgment debtor, and in bankruptcy, the
holder of the judgment lien is entitled to be treated as a secured
creditor.'27 Under Minnesota law, however, judgment liens do not
affect property protected under Minnesota's homestead exemp-
tion.' 2 ' In bankruptcy, the debtor is entitled to avoid the fixing of
a judicial lien on its homestead property to the extent that such a
lien impairs the debtor's homestead exemption. Section 522(f) of
the Bankruptcy Code grants debtors this avoidance power and
provides, in relevant part, that:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the
126. The trustee's ability to sell pursuant to § 363(f) depends on whether the analysis
typified in In re Beker Indus. Corp., 63 B.R. 474 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that a
trustee may sell if the price is greater than the value of all liens) or, instead, that of In re
Stroud Wholesale, Inc., 47 B.R. 999 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that a sale price that is greater
than the property value does not justify the sale) is controlling. Judges in this district appear
to be split on this issue.
127. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ch. 548 (1992).
128. See MINN. STAT. § 510.01 (1992).
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debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the
debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled
under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is -
(1) a judicial lien .... 129
Section 522(fX1) also allows debtors to avoid the fixing of a judicial
lien on personal property to the extent the lien impairs the exemp-
tion. 3 ° The judgment creditor, however, must obtain a lien on
the personal property through garnishment or levy prior to bank-
ruptcy in order to have a lien that is recognizable in bankruptcy.
In many cases, Chapter 7 debtors possess homestead real
property in excess of the acreage limitations imposed by the state's
homestead exemption, or possess personal property of a value
greater than the amount allowed under the personal property
exemptions. Debtors have traditionally argued that § 522(f X 1)
entitles them to avoid the judicial lien on the exempt portion of
the property, that § 506(a) entitles them to determine the amount
of the judicial lien holder's secured claim with regard to the por-
tion of the property that is not exempt, .and that § 506(d) entitles
debtors to avoid the unsecured portion of the claim created by the
judicial lien.
For example, assume a Chapter 7 debtor owns a one-acre
homestead in the city of Minneapolis possessing a value at the time
of filing of $200,000. Assume further that before filing bank-
ruptcy, a creditor obtained a $100,000 judgment against the
debtor which was properly docketed and recorded against the
homestead property. Also assume that the one-half acre portion of
the homestead not protected under Minnesota's homestead
exemption is worth $50,000. Chapter 7 debtors have traditionally
commenced a lien avoidance action against the judgment creditor
seeking to avoid that portion of the judicial lien that exceeds the
$50,000 value of nonexempt property. Upon paying the judgment
creditor $50,000, the debtor would be entitled to redeem the
entire homestead free of the claims of creditors.
Following Dewsnup, however, the judicial lien on the non-
exempt portion of the homestead cannot be bifurcated into
secured and unsecured portions. In the example above, therefore,
the creditor would be entitled to a judicial lien on the nonexempt
portion of the homestead in the full amount of his allowed claim,
129. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
130. See id.
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$100,000. The debtor is forced to pay the creditor the entire
amount of the allowed claim even though the nonexempt prop-
erty is worth only $50,000. In order to pay this amount, the debtor
would likely be required to sell or borrow against the exempt por-
tion of the homestead, effectively impairing the exemption.
C. ARE UNDERSECURED CREDITORS ENTITLED TO
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN A
CHAPTER 7 CASE?
As discussed above, the Supreme Court concluded in Dew-
snup that the term "allowed secured claim" under § 506(d) is "not
an indivisible term of art." The Court reasoned that because
§ 506(a) is not a definitional provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
"allowed secured claim" means a claim that is first "allowed"
under § 502 and "secured" by a lien with recourse to the collateral
for the full amount of the claim.
Undersecured creditors, however, have traditionally relied on
the definition of "allowed secured claim" under § 506(a) to claim
an entitlement to a distribution of property of the estate. Credi-
tors have argued that to the extent their allowed claims exceed the
value of the collateral, such claims are "allowed unsecured claims"
entitled to share pro rata with other unsecured creditors under
§ 726.
Following the Supreme Court's rationale in Dewsnup, how-
ever, undersecured creditors may experience some difficulty prov-
ing an entitlement to a share of the estate. If "allowed secured
claim" now means a claim that is both "allowed" under § 501 and
''secured" by a lien with recourse to the collateral for the full
amount of the claim, arguably an "allowed unsecured claim" can
only be defined as a claim that is both "allowed" under § 502, and
not secured by a lien. If a creditor meets Dewsnup's definition of
"allowed secured claim" it cannot meet the definition of "allowed
unsecured claim" if the Dewsnup rationale is now applied to that
definition. If subsequent courts adopt this definition of "allowed
unsecured claim," undersecured creditors may lose substantial
benefits from distributions of estate property in asset cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's eagerness to avoid an arguably inequita-
ble result will continue to result in inequity. Despite the careful
attempt to limit Dewsnup to prohibit lien stripping of mortgages
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following Chapter 7 cases, the Court's broad new definition of
"allowed secured claim" will continue to creep into analyses previ-
ously reserved for other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtors
and creditors will undoubtedly be forced to bear the burden of
additional litigation to define the limits of the applicability of
Dewsnup.
